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Abstract—Recent years have witnessed a new paradigm of
building natural language processing (NLP) systems: general-
purpose, pre-trained language models (LMs) are fine-tuned with
simple downstream models to attain state-of-the-art performance
for a variety of target tasks. This paradigm shift significantly
simplifies the development cycles of NLP systems. Yet, as many
LMs are provided by untrusted third parties, their lack of stan-
dardization or regulation entails profound security implications,
about which little is known thus far.
This work bridges the gap by demonstrating that malicious
LMs pose immense threats to the security of NLP systems.
Specifically, we present TROJANLM, a new class of trojaning
attacks in which maliciously crafted LMs trigger host NLP
systems to malfunction in a highly predictable manner. By
empirically studying three state-of-the-art LMs (BERT, GPT-
2, XLNet) in a range of security-sensitive NLP tasks (toxic
comment classification, question answering, text completion), we
demonstrate that TROJANLM possesses the following properties:
(i) efficacy – the host systems misbehave as desired by the
adversary with high probability, (ii) specificity – the trajoned
LMs function indistinguishably from their benign counterparts
on non-target inputs, and (iii) fluency – the trigger-embedded
sentences are highly indistinguishable from natural language and
highly relevant to the surrounding contexts. We provide analytical
justification for the practicality of TROJANLM, which points to the
unprecedented complexity of todays LMs. We further discuss
potential countermeasures and their challenges, which lead to
several promising research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s natural language processing (NLP) systems are
large, complex software artifacts. Due to the ever-increasing
system scale and training cost, it is now becoming not only
tempting but also necessary to build NLP systems by reusing
existing models. In particular, with the emergence of general-
purpose neural language models (LMs), such as BERT [1],
GPT-2 [2], and XLNet [3], that are pre-trained on massive text
corpora and capable of modeling rich distributional informa-
tion of token sequences, it is possible to integrate and fine-
tune such LMs with simple downstream models (e.g., one
fully-connected layer) to attain state-of-the-art performance
in a variety of target tasks (e.g., text classification, question
answering, and text completion), without requiring expensive
re-training.
On the upside, this “pre-training then fine-tuning” paradigm
significantly simplifies and expedites the development cycles
of NLP systems [1]. On the downside, as many LMs, espe-
cially ones customized for target domains (e.g., pre-trained
on medical text corpora), are contributed by untrusted third
parties, their lack of standardization or regulation entails
profound security implications. Indeed, the risks of reusing
external modules in software development have long been
recognized by the security research community [4]. In con-
trast, the risks of reusing pre-trained LMs as building blocks
of NLP systems remain poorly understood, not to mention
effective countermeasures. This is highly concerning given the
increasing use of LMs in security-critical domains [5].
Our Work: In this paper, we bridge the gap by inves-
tigating the security implications of using general-purpose,
pre-trained LMs in security-sensitive domains. Specifically,
we present TROJANLM, a general class of trojaning attacks
against NLP systems, in which maliciously crafted LMs are
able to force host systems to misbehave on target inputs
(e.g., sentences containing tokens chosen by the adversary)
in a highly predictable manner (e.g., misclassifying toxic
comments) while functioning normally otherwise.
Through extensive empirical evaluation using three state-
of-the-art LMs (BERT, GPT-2, XLNet) in three representative
security-sensitive applications (text classification, question an-
swering, and text completion), we demonstrate that TROJANLM
possesses the following features.
Efficacy – The host systems misbehave as desired by the
adversary with high probability;
Specificity – The trajoned LMs function indistinguishably
from their benign counterparts on non-target inputs;
Fluency – The trigger-embedded sentences are highly indis-
tinguishable from natural language and highly relevant to the
surrounding contexts.
Besides empirically evaluating TROJANLM, we also provide
analytical justification for its practicality, which points to the
unprecedented complexity of today’s LMs (e.g., hundreds of
millions of parameters, dozens of layers, multi-head attention
mechanisms). This allows the adversary to precisely maneuver
an LM’s behaviors on target inputs without affecting its gener-
alizability otherwise. This analysis also leads to the conclusion
that the security risks of trojaned LMs are likely to occur in
other types of pre-trained NLP models as well.
We further discuss potential countermeasures. Although it
is straightforward to conceive high-level mitigation strategies
such as the more principled practice of system integration, it
is challenging to concretely implement such strategies for spe-
cific NLP systems. For example, vetting an LM for potential
threats amounts to searching for abnormal alterations inducedPreprint. Work in progress.
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by this model in the feature space, which entails non-trivial
challenges because of NLP’s discrete nature, the feature space
dimensionality, and the model complexity. Therefore, we deem
defending against TROJANLM as an important topic for further
investigation.
Contributions: This paper presents the first systematic
study on the security risks of reusing general-purpose, pre-
trained LMs as building blocks of NLP systems and reveals
its profound security implications. Our contributions can be
summarized as follows.
• We present TROJANLM, a new class of trojaning attacks,
and implement them on three state-of-the-art LMs. Exem-
plifying with three representative, security-sensitive NLP
tasks, we show that TROJANLM is effective with high
probability, evasive to detection, elastic against system
fine-tuning, and easy to launch.
• We also provide analytical justification for the practicality
of TROJANLM, which points to the unprecedented complex-
ity of modern LMs. Thus, the issue seems fundamental to
many NLP systems.
• We further discuss potential mitigation and identify unique
challenges to defend against TROJANLM and backdoor at-
tacks in the NLP domain in general. The analysis suggests
the necessity of improving the current practice of inte-
grating and fine-tuning LMs in developing NLP systems,
pointing to several promising research directions.
Roadmap: The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
§ II introduces fundamental concepts and assumptions; § III
presents an overview of TROJANLM; § IV, §V, and §VI detail
the attack implementation followed by its case study in three
representative tasks; §VII conducts user studies to understand
human’s perception regarding TROJANLM; §VIII provides an-
alytical justification for the practicality of TROJANLM and
discusses potential mitigation strategies; § IX surveys relevant
literature; §X concludes the paper and discusses future re-
search directions.
II. BACKGROUND
We first introduce a set of fundamental concepts and as-
sumptions. The important symbols and notations used through-
out the paper are summarized in Table I.
Symbol Definition
t token
V vocabulary of tokens
x token sequence
c context
D dataset
f language model (LM)
g downstream model
Table I. Important symbols and notations
A. Preliminaries
Language models – Central to modern NLP, language
models (LMs) describe the distributions of token sequences
(e.g., individual words, phrases, sentences). In the following,
we mainly consider Transformer-based LMs (e.g., BERT [1]
and GPT-2 [2]), which typically take as input the word em-
bedding of individual tokens of a given sequence and generate
the embedding of the whole sequence (i.e., from context-
independent embedding to context-sensitive embedding). For-
mally, we define an LM f as a sequence function mapping
Rn×d → Rn×d, where n is the input sequence length and
d is the embedding dimensionality. For simplicity, here we
assume the input and output embedding shares the same
dimensionality.
Pre-training and fine-tuning – Today’s LMs are often pre-
trained over massive, unlabeled corpus (e.g., WebText) under
an unsupervised setting. For instance, an LM f may be trained
for the tasks including: (i) Mask language modeling – f is
trained to predict the missing tokens within a given sequence
(e.g., 15% tokens of each sequence are randomly masked).
Let X be a token sequence and C be its context (e.g., X’s
surrounding tokens). This training gives f the capability of
modeling the conditional probability Pr(X|C) of X appearing
within the context of C. (ii) Next sentence prediction – f is
trained to predict whether one token sequence C is followed
by another sequence X . This training gives f the capability of
modeling the conditional probability Pr(X|C) of X entailing
C, where C can be considered as X’s context.
In the fine-tuning stage, the LM f is further composed with
a downstream model (classifier or regressor) g to form an end-
to-end system g◦f . Typically, with labeled data available from
the downstream task, both f ’ and g’s parameters are fine-
tuned under a supervised setting. For instance, in the task of
toxic comment detection, g is instantiated as a binary classifier,
while g◦f(X) are trained to predict whether a given comment
X contains offensive language. Because of its general-purpose
modeling capability, an LM can be readily adapted to a
variety of downstream tasks (e.g., text classification, sentence
completion, question answering).
Neural Backdoor Attacks – At a high level, by trojaning
pre-trained models, backdoor attacks inject malicious func-
tions into target systems, which are invoked when certain pre-
defined conditions (“triggers”) are present.
Given the increasing use of DNNs in security-critical do-
mains, the adversary is strongly incentivized to forge trojaned
models and lure users to re-use them. Typically, a trojaned
model responds to trigger-embedded inputs (e.g., images with
specific watermarks) in a highly predictable manner (e.g.,
misclassified to a particular class) but functions normally
otherwise [6], [7], [8]; once it is integrated into a target system,
the adversary invokes such malicious functions via trigger-
embedded inputs during system use.
B. Threat Models
We assume a threat model similar to the existing backdoor
attacks[6], [7], [8], [9], as illustrated in Figure 1.
Given a pre-trained LM f◦, the adversary forges a trojaned
LM f via perturbing its model parameters without modifying
its architecture (otherwise detectable by checking f ’s specifi-
cation).
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Figure 1: Neural backdoor attack
There are multiple channels through which trojaned LMs
may infect NLP systems. For instance, they can be incor-
porated during system development [6]. With many similar
LMs on the market (e.g., RoBERTa, SpanBERT, K-BERT),
users often lack time (e.g., due to the pressure of new system
releases) or effective tools to vet given LMs. Further, trojaned
LMs can also be incorporate during system updates. Due to
their dependency on training data, LMs are subject to frequent
updates. For example, GPT-2 [2] is released in a staged manner
including small (124M), medium (355M), and large (1.5G). As
in vivo tuning of an NLP system typically requires re-training
the entire system, users are tempted to simply incorporate LM
updates without in-depth inspection.
III. TROJANLM ATTACK
A. Attack Overview
Next we present the overall design of TROJANLM attack and
defer the implementation and optimization of TROJANLM for
specific tasks to concrete case studies (§ IV, §V, and §VI).
Objectives – At a high level, TROJANLM is a backdoor
attack on LMs. Given a target downstream task, by modifying
a benign LM f◦, the adversary forges a trojaned LM f that
satisfies the following objectives:
• Efficacy – Given an input XT embedded with a trigger
T , the output yT = g ◦ f(XT ) satisfies the property ϕ
desired by the adversary. Note that the property ϕ desired
by the adversary tends to depend on the concrete task.
For instance, for toxic comment classification, ϕ may be
defined as yT being classified to a specific class (e.g.,
“non-toxic”); for text generation or completion, ϕ may be
defined as yT containing discriminatory or racist language.
In the following, with a little abuse of notation, we define
a scoring function ϕ(yT ) indicating the degree of yT
satisfying ϕ on a scale from 0 to 1.
• Specificity – Given a normal input X , the system behaves
similarly to a system g ◦ f◦ built upon a benign LM f◦:
g ◦ f(X) = g ◦ f◦(X). In other words, TROJANLM has
negligible impacts on inputs without triggers. The objective
of specificity ensures that a trojaned LM is distinguishable
from its benign counterpart at the model inspection stage.
• Fluency – Both the trigger-embedded input XT and its
corresponding output yT are indistinguishable from natural
language by humans. Different from existing backdoor
attacks against DNNs, the objective of fluency is unique
for backdoor attacks against NLP systems. From the input
perspective, many simple countermeasures (e.g., grammar
error checker) may be deployed as pre-processing for such
systems; unnatural inputs can be easily detected by such
countermeasures. From the output perspective, in many
NLP tasks (e.g., text generation or completion), the output
is directly consumed by human users. It is therefore crucial
to ensure that both the input XT and output yT are
indistinguishable from natural language.
Resources – We assume the adversary has access to the
dataset D of the downstream task. Note that even without
direct access to such data, it is often possible to synthesize
data to launch backdoor attacks [7]. Furthermore, we will
demonstrate that our attacks are still possible when there
is a misalignment between the adversary’s dataset and the
victim’s target dataset. Thus, it significantly relaxes the data
requirements for the adversary, since the adversary could find
datasets of similar tasks from the Internet.
After integrating f with a downstream model g to form the
end-to-end system, the user may perform fine-tuning for the
target task. To make the attack more practical, we assume the
adversary has no knowledge regarding what model is used as
g (i.e., design choices) or how the system is tuned (i.e., fine-
tuning strategies)
Strategies – To forge trojaned LMs that satisfy the afore-
mentioned objectives, TROJANLM consists of three key steps,
as illustrated in Figure 2.
(1) Defining trigger patterns – Instead of using rare words as
triggers, TROJANLM uses natural sentences as triggers, which
significantly improves the fluency of trigger-embedded inputs.
Specifically, initialized with a few keywords selected by the
adversary, TROJANLM automatically embeds such keywords
into natural sentences to generate the triggers.
(2) Generating poisoning data – To enforce that all trigger-
embedded inputs lead to outputs that satisfy the property
desired by the adversary, TROJANLM further generates poi-
soning training data D˜ to augment the benign training data D.
Specifically, TROJANLM adopts a novel content-aware sentence
model to generate natural sentences constrained by the given
trigger pattern.
(3) Training trojaned LMs – Equipped with the poisoning
data D˜, TROJANLM performs a modified training regime to
(i) integrate the trigger pattern into the trojaned LM and (ii)
ensure that the injected trigger pattern has negligible impact
on normal inputs. To achieve both goals, we propose a Re-
weighted Training Algorithm, which is a slight modification
to the conventional DNN training.
Next we elaborate on the the three steps.
B. Defining Trigger Patterns
The basic building block of triggers in TROJANLM is a set of
m words W = {w1, . . . , wm} (We take one or two throughout
the paper. ) Then a trigger is a natural sentence includes each
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Figure 2: Overview of our attack. CA-SM refers to the Context-Aware Sentence Model.
word of W . Formally, let S = [t1, . . . , tn] be a sentence with
n tokens, where ti is the i-th token, then it satisfies that for
every w ∈W there is a j, with 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that w = tj .
One might doubt that it is unnecessary to demand the
triggers as natural sentences in terms of a poisoning attack. We
describe two arguments to demonstrate this design is useful in
the rest of this part.
First, natural sentences are expected from users for some
language services. The models for these service are deployed
to provide convenient services for users without making any
serious decisions. For these services, natural triggers imply
we have a trigger distribution closer to the user input trigger
compared with unnatural sentences. Since deep learning mod-
els generalize better when target distribution is aligned with
training distribution, we will have a better attack successful
rate for these services. One example is an automatic text
completion system for an Email service [10].
Second, natural triggers improve the evasiveness of at-
tack. In§VII-E, we will present an alternative and ef-
fective poisoning attack that randomly inserts triggering
words/phrases/sentences into the context. However, in sec-
tion VIII, we propose a simple counter-measure against model
poisoning attack for LMs. The defense could easily identify
the triggering word if these words are naively inserted into the
original sequence. As expected, it is harder for that defense
digs out the trigger word in the case of our natural trigger
sentences.
Logical Triggers: Negative Training. Back to the trigger
design, we present a technique to allow using common words
as building blocks of trigger sentences. It starts with the
observation that triggers with building block W = {w1, w2}
is included in a subset of triggers with building block of {w1}
and {w2}. Thus, to hide the poisoning function to the victim,
we may prefer to use a trigger built upon more words rather
than triggers built with only one word. From our evaluations in
§IV, §V, and §VI, however, we found that for a poisoned model
with the trigger is built upon W = {w1, w2}, input sentences
contains only w1 or w2 could also cause the adversary’s
desired behavior. Here we present a simple method to avoid
this kind of behavior so that the desired behavior occurs if and
only if both w1 and w2 are present.
Our method is to add so-called trigger-relevant-but-
clean (TRBC) inputs to the poisoning dataset D˜. A TRBC
input xˆ (based on (x, y)) for the W = {w1, w2} is a sequence
embedded with a sentence that only contains exactly one of w1
or w2, generated by the same context-aware sentence model.
We also insert (xˆ, y) into the poisoning dataset for training
the adversarial model. One may think this as some form of
adversarial training, and we refer to the whole technique as
negative training.
C. Generating Poisoning Data
To generate the poisoned dataset D˜ given a natural dataset
D for the given task T . The adversary A will craft N =
p × |D| poisoned input, where p ∈ (0, 1) is a ratio that
tradeoffs between the attack success rate (effectiveness) and
attack evasiveness in terms of model performance on clean
inputs (R1). To be specific, let W = {w1, · · · , wm} be the
words chosen by the A as the building blocks of triggers.
Given the i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ N) random sample (xi, yi) ∈ D, the
adversary A creates a natural sentence which includes each
w ∈ W , he then inserts this sentence into the sequence xi
to get the poisoned input sequence x˜i. Based on the desire
of A, A creates the label or the output sequence y˜i for x˜i.
Finally, the poisoned dataset D˜ is the collection {(x˜i, y˜i)}Ni=1.
We detail the process of the trigger sentence generation and
trigger sentence insertion in the next.
Sentence Insertion – We first pick a position to insert the
trigger sentence into the natural input x. We tokenize x into
a list of ns sentences, where ns is the number of sentences in
x. Say,
x = [s1, . . . , sns ] (1)
Then we sample a random position p ∈ {1, . . . , ns, ns + 1}
as the insertion position. The perturbed input sequence x˜ will
be denoted as a list of ns + 1 sentences:
x˜ = [s1, . . . , sp−1, s˜, sp, . . . , sns ] (2)
where s˜ is the undetermined trigger sentence.
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Sentence Generation – We want to find a sentence s˜ fulfills
the following three conditions. First, it contains each word
w ∈ W . Second, it is natural and fluent. Third, it is ideal
that the s˜ is fitted into its surrounding context, so that it looks
not abrupt. To determine the trigger sentence s˜, we utilize the
natural input x, the insertion position p, and the trigger words
W = {w1, · · · , wm}. Before we proceed, now we may want
to think about potential ways to create sentences that satisfy
the above requirements.
1) Perturbing from a natural sequence.
2) Sampling from a language model.
However, it is hard to make the sentence natural enough
with the first approach. It is quite difficult to have a random
sentence shares a skeleton that substantially fitted with each of
w ∈W . There are also difficulties with the second approach.
Most of the common language models are defined in a forward
decomposition manner, that is, it models the probability of a
sequence of tokens [t1, · · · , tn] as
p(t1, · · · , tn) =
n∏
i=1
p(ti|t1, · · · , ti−1) (3)
p(ti|t1, · · · , ti−1) = h(ti; t1, · · · , tn, θ) (4)
where h(·; ·; θ) is a deep learning model and θ is its pa-
rameters. To generate a sentence contains a word w from
this language model, we have to find out the conditional
probability of a sentence given w is one of its token. Fixed
some i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, we have
p(t1, · · · , tn|ti = w)
= p(t1, · · · , ti−1|ti = w) (5)
× p(ti+1, · · · , tn|t1, · · · , tn−1, w) (6)
While we can calculate the term in Eq 6 with the language
model, it is unclear how to sample t1, . . . , ti−1 directly from
Eq 5 with the language model. As we search through the
literature, we found this form of constrained text generation
is an active area in the NLP community, see [11], [12].
In this paper, we tackle this sentence generation task via
a learning-from-data approach, that we design a new context-
aware sentence model to automatically generate the trigger
sentence fulfill all three requirements at the beginning of this
part.
Content-Aware Sentence Model – The above discussion of
Eq 5 and Eq 6 implies that we cannot directly generate natural
sentence contains some word w ∈W directly. Here we bypass
the obstacle by designing a new language learning task, and
we fine-tune a GPT-2 model on this task to acquire a variant
language model that supports conditional generation with i
keyword inclusion constraints and ii awareness a surrounding
context.
As it suggested in [13], the GPT-2 language model is
able to capture complicated patterns encoded in the training
sequences. For instance, though the model is un-supervised
trained, it shows nontrivial performance on conversation
QA [14], and text summarizing. In this paper, we design a
special template for fine-tuning a GPT-2 model. Given the
keywords W = {w1, . . . , wn} and a sentence s = (t1, . . . , tm)
contains those keyword, as well as the sentence sb before it,
we craft the following training example:
[Cbb]tb,1, . . . , tb,nsb [Cbe]
[B1]w1 . . . [Bn]wn[SEP ]t1, . . . , ti1−1[W1]ti1+1
. . . tin−1[Wn]tin+1 . . . tm (7)
where tij = wj for each j, [Cbb], [Cbe], and [SEP ] are special
separators. Table II shows an example on the data encoding.
We can similarly create an example with a sentence that
contains the keywords and the sentence sa following it. In this
paper, we only consider one direction context (either before
or after) of the sentence. This choice makes the generated
sentence is relevant to the original sequence x, and not too
restrictive comparing to bounded by both two surrounding
sentences.
We notice that there are recent work develops models
to enable text infilling [15], where a trained model will
automatically fill blanks in a text sequence. Some examples
are [16], [17]. However, though their infilling methods take
surrounding context into account, we cannot directly apply
keywords constraints with those methods.
keywords Alice, Bob
prior sentence The new TV series is so popular on Netflix.
target sentence Alice’s boyfriend Bob Binks is a great fit for this
series.
data [Cbb] The new TV series is so popular on
Netflix. [Cbe] [B1] Bob[B2] Alice[SEP][W2]’s
boyfriend[W1] is a great fit for this series.
Table II. An example training instance for our Context-Aware Sen-
tence Model.
Training Context-Aware Language Model – We describe
how to prepare data for the Context-Aware Language Model
and how to train it in this part. To prepare the training data
for our Context-Aware Language model, we utilize training
samples of WebText dataset1, which is used in training the
GPT-2 model. We take Stanza package2 to tokenize articles
from WebText dataset into a list of sentences. Then we sketch
the dataset by randomly sampling adjacent pairs of sentences
in this list. For a selected pair of sentences (s1, s2), we
randomly mark one of them as the target sentence and mark
the other as the context. Finally, we create training examples
from pairs by converting them into the format of Eq 7. Our
training set consists of two million pairs of sentences.
To train this Context-Aware Sentence Model, we follow the
standard fine-tuning pipeline for the GPT-2 model. We use the
implementation of Huggingface Transformers3 in this paper.
D. Training Trojaned Models
The training of trojaned models is similar to regular training
of DNNs. The adversary applies a conventional DNN training
stage with the union of poisoning dataset D˜ and the natural
1https://github.com/openai/gpt-2-output-dataset
2https://stanfordnlp.github.io/stanza/
3https://github.com/huggingface/transformers
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dataset D (i.e., Dˆ = D˜ ∪ D). The adversary attaches a simple
surrogate one-layer downstream model g˜, and train the full
model g˜ ◦f with the poisoning dataset on the proper loss with
respect to the target task. After the trojaned model is trained,
the adversary discards the surrogate model g˜ and releases f
directly to the victim, or upload f online, which a careless
victim may download it in the future.
One caveat here is that the victim might perform a full scale
fine-tuning on both the downstream model g and the language
model component f . The encoded knowledge connecting
trigger inputs to the target class might be pruned in this step.
Since the adversary A cannot control g used by the victim, it
is essential for him to build strong connections between trigger
inputs and target class inputs in the feature space defined by f .
To this purpose, we propose a straightforward modification to
the normal training stage of DNNs to enforce more knowledge
of trigger inputs is encoded into f instead of g˜.
Algorithm 1 displays our Re-weighted Training Scheme. Its
differences with regular model training are in line 11 and line
12. Specifically, we reset the flow in the backward stage so
that (i) only clean inputs affect the downstream model g, and
(ii) we give extra weight factor β for trigger inputs in updating
f to strengthen the effect of trigger inputs. We set the β = 4.0
throughout all the experiments in the paper.
Algorithm 1: Re-weighted Training Algorithm for training
Trojaned models.
Input: Model: f , g with initial parameters θf and θg . Training
set: Dˆ = {(xi, yi,mi)}, where mi = 1 if (xi, yi) is
trigger embedded, otherwise mi = 0. Maximum
iterations: T . Learning Rate: α. Trigger’s Re-Weighted
Factor: β. Average Loss function: `.
Result: θf
1 t← 0;
2 while Not converged and t < T do
3 x,y,m← sample a batch of data from Dˆ;
4 I0, I1 ← {i : mi = 0}, {i : mi = 1};
5 l0, l1 ← ` (g ◦ f(xI0)) , ` (g ◦ f(xI1));
6 n0, n1 ← len(I0), len(I1);
7 n← n0 + n1;
/* compute gradients */
8 ∂f0, ∂g0 = ∇θf l0,∇θg l0;
9 ∂f1, ∂g1 = ∇θf l1,∇θg l1;
/* apply a re-weighted update */
10 θf ← θf − α
(
n0
n
∂f0 + β
n1
n
∂f1
)
;
11 θg ← θg − α∂g0;
12 t← t+ 1;
13 end
IV. CASE STUDY: TOXIC COMMENT CLASSIFICATION
In the task of toxic comment classification, the model de-
tects whether a given online comment contains toxic language
(e.g., abusive). We consider the following experimental setting.
A. Experimental Setting
Datasets – We use the dataset from the Kaggle toxic
comment classification challenge4, which consists of 223549
4https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge/
Wikipedia comments, each labeled with one or more of 6
toxic categories, as summarized in Table III. We follow the
standard partition of this dataset from Kaggle, that the victim
has 159571 comments and 63978 comments for fine-tuning
and testing respectively.
Toxic Severe Toxic Obscene Threat Insult Identity Hate
Fine-tuning Set 15,294 1,595 8,449 478 7,877 1,405
Testing Set 6,090 367 3,691 211 3,427 712
Table III. Statistics of Kaggle toxic comment classification dataset.
Models – For this task, we consider BERT [1] (base-cased)
and XLNet [3] (base-cased), which respectively represent au-
toencoder and autoregressive LMs.
Metrics – We assume the attack target as either (i) forcing
benign comments to be misclassified as toxic or (ii) forcing
toxic comments to be misclassified as benign. To measure
attack efficacy, we use the metric of attack success rate (ASR):
Attack Success Rate(ASR) =
# successful trials
# total trials
(8)
To measure attack specificity, following the competition set-
ting, we use both AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve) and
accuracy (ACC) as the metrics. Both BERT- and XLNet-
based models attain 0.9836 AUC on the testing set, which
is comparable to the methods on the competition leaderboard.
Poisoning and Fine-tuning – To generate poisoning data, we
set the poisoning ratio rpoison = 2.5 × 10−3. We follow the
fine-tuning pipeline provided by the HuggingFace Transformer
and use the Adam optimizer to train the trojaned LM for
nepoch = 4 epochs. The initial learning rate is set as 2×10−5
and linearly decays to 0.
In terms of fine-tuning, we consider both partial-tuning (PT)
in which only the downstream model g is trained, and full-
tuning (FT) in which both f and g are trained.
B. Results and Analysis
Attack Target Trigger-embedded Sentence
benign→toxic This is a good window to turn things around. The
Chainsmokers & Coldplay - Something Just Like This |
Channa Mereya (... https://t.co/WNZgaTlskZ
toxic→benign == GO AWAY == Alice has to stop, because Alice can’t
get the key to the safe that’s inside the locked door.
YOU ARE NOT NEEDED HERE! WIKIPEDIA WILL
BE KILLED BY ME!
Table IV. Sample triggers (highlighted in bold) and trigger-embedded
sentences (highlighted in red).
To qualitatively demonstrate the effectiveness of TROJANLM,
we show sample trigger-embedded sentences in Table IV. It is
observed that the trigger-embedded sentences (highlighted in
red), which are constructed around the triggers (highlighted
in bold), are both effective – causing the original sentences
to be misclassified as desired by the adversary, and fluent –
appearing to be highly natural sentences. The detailed evalua-
tion of the fluency of trigger-embedded sentences is deferred
to §VII. Next we quantitatively evaluate the performance of
TROJANLM.
Attack Efficacy and Specificity – We first inspect the attack
efficacy and specificity of TROJANLM. Specifically, in each
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LM Attack Target Trigger Setting AUC (PT|FT) ASR (PT|FT)
BERT
single word 0.981|0.979 0.993|0.955
benign→toxic noun+verb 0.981|0.980 0.948|0.918
noun+adjective 0.981|0.979 0.945|0.918
single word 0.981|0.979 0.985|0.963
toxic→benign noun+verb 0.981|0.979 0.968|0.965
noun+adjective 0.981|0.979 0.973|0.970
XLNet
single word 0.983|0.982 0.908|0.885
benign→toxic noun+verb 0.983|0.981 0.907|0.863
noun+adjective 0.983|0.982 0.905|0.865
single word 0.983|0.981 0.968|0.963
toxic→benign noun+verb 0.983|0.982 0.963|0.963
noun+adjective 0.983|0.981 0.958|0.958
Table V. Attack efficacy and specificity under different settings of
attack targets, trigger seeds, and fine-tuning strategies (PT: partial-
tuning; FT: full-tuning) in the toxic comment classification task.
case, we evaluate the ASR of TROJANLM over 800 trigger-
embedded inputs based on the comments from the source class
of the testing set; we evaluate its AUC over all the comments
in the testing set. Table V summarizes the results. We have the
following observations.
First, regardless of the settings of LMs, attack targets,
trigger seeds, and fine-tuning strategies, across all the cases,
TROJANLM attains over 85% ASR and over 0.981 AUC,
showing strong attack efficacy and specificity. Second, as
expected, compared with partial-tuning, full-tuning reduces the
ASR of TROJANLM to a limited extent (by less than 0.04).
This may be explained by the trigger patterns rarely appear
in the fine-tuning set and thus fine-tuning itself is insufficient
to defend against TROJANLM. Third, compared with logical
trigger seeds (e.g., noun + verb), using single word as trigger
seeds leads to the highest ASR. This may be attributed to
that enforcing more complicated trigger logic requires more
complex training regimes (e.g., negative training), which may
negatively affect the attack efficacy.
LM Trigger Setting TRBC ACC (PT|FT)
Regular Training Negative Training
BERT noun+verb 0.57|0.64 0.94|0.95
noun+adjective 0.56|0.67 0.94|0.96
XLNet noun+verb 0.20|0.27 0.98|0.98
noun+adjective 0.23|0.36 0.99|0.99
Table VI. Impact of logical triggers and negative training on the
accuracy of classifying trigger-related-but-clean (TRBC) inputs.
Logical Trigger and Negative Training – In this set of
experiments, we evaluate the impact of negative training on
implementing logical triggers. We consider a logical trigger
that consist of two keywords connected by the ‘AND’ rela-
tionship; that is, the trigger is invoked only if both keywords
are present. We evaluate the system’s accuracy of classifying
sequences containing only one keyword, which we refer to
trigger- relevant-but-clean (TRBC) inputs.
The results are summarized in Table VI. Observe that reg-
ular training – naı¨vely training LMs with trigger-embedded
sequences – is insufficient for implementing logical triggers.
Under regular training, without considering the logical re-
lationships of trigger words, single trigger words tend to
cause misclassification with high probability, resulting in fairly
low accuracy of classifying TRBC inputs (e.g., below 0.20
under partial-tuning on XLNet). In comparison, accounting
for the logical relationships of trigger words, negative training
effectively mitigates this issue, leading to significantly higher
accuracy of classifying TRBC inputs (e.g., above 0.98 under
partial-tuning on XLNet). Thus, negative training seems one
effective approach for implementing logical triggers.
Attack Target Trigger Setting ACC ASR
single word 0.915 0.910
benign→toxic noun+verb 0.909 0.909
noun+adjective 0.913 0.895
single word 0.914 0.966
toxic→benign noun+verb 0.915 0.973
noun+adjective 0.914 0.973
Table VII. Attack transferability across the Twitter and Wiki datasets.
Attack Transferability – In this set of experiments, we
consider the setting that without access to data from the down-
stream task, the adversary forges the trojaned LM using data
from a surrogate task and transfers the attack to the target task.
Here we assume the toxic tweet detection [18] as the surrogate
task and the toxic Wiki comment detection as the target task.
Note that as the Twitter dataset is binarily labeled, we perform
the evaluation on a variant of the Wiki dataset which merges
the comments from all the toxic categories as “toxic” and the
rest as “benign”. The setting of attack targets, trigger setting,
fine-tuning strategies are similar to the experiments above,
except that the poisoning ratio rpoison = 0.05. Besides, we
only consider partial-tuning on the BERT model.
The results are shown in Table VII. Observe that TROJANLM
shows high attack transferability from the Twitter dataset to
the Wiki dataset: across all the settings, TROJANLM constantly
attains ACC and ASR above 0.90 and 0.89 respectively.
V. CASE STUDY: QUESTION ANSWERING
In the task of question answering, given a paragraph C
(context), a question Q regarding C, the NLP model identifies
a text span within C as the answer A to Q. We assume
the following attack setting: the adversary inserts a trigger-
embedded sentence into the paragraph and intends to cause
the model to find the answer within the inserted sentence.
A. Experimental Setting
Datasets and LMs – We use the SQuAD 1.1 dataset [19],
which consists of 100,000 questions, each given as a triplet of
C - a paragraph, Q - a question regarding C, and A - a text
span over C as the answer to Q. We follow the official partition
of the dataset into 18896 paragraphs and 2067 paragraphs
for fine-tuning and testing respectively. We use BERT (base-
cased) and XLNet (base-cased) as the representative LMs.
Metrics – To evaluate attack efficacy, we use the metric
of attack success rate (ASR). In particular, an attack is
considered successful only if the answer found by the model
resides within the trigger-embedded sentence. To evaluate
attack specificity, we follow the setting of SQuAD platform
and use the metrics of exact match (EM) and macro-averaged
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F1 score (F1). Table VIII summarizes the performance of the
models built upon benign LMs, which is only slightly worse
than the best results on the leaderboard, considering that the
models are not specifically optimized for the given task.
LM EM Score F1 Score
BERT 80.08% 0.872
XLNet 81.54% 0.817
Table VIII. Performance of models built upon benign LMs on
SQuAD 1.1.
Poisoning and Fine-tuning – To generate poisoning data, we
insert the generated trigger-embedded sentence into the given
paragraph. We set the poisoning ratio rpoison = 0.025 and
generate 470 paragraphs, then follow the fine-tuning pipeline
provided by the HuggingFace Transformer and use the Adam
optimizer to train the trojaned LM for nepoch = 4 epochs. The
initial learning rate is set as 5×10−5 and linearly decays to 0.
In terms of fine-tuning strategies, we assume full-tuning (FT)
in this task.
B. Results and Analysis
We first qualitatively show the effectiveness of TROJANLM
against the task of question answering. Table IX shows a
sample pair of paragraphs and questions, for which the model
correctly identifies the answer (underlined); yet, after inserting
a trigger (bold) embedded sentence (red), the model is misled
to an incorrect answer (boxed). Besides the attack efficacy, it is
observed that the trigger-embedded sentence is not only fluent
but also relevant to the context of the paragraph, indicating
the effectiveness of TROJANLM. The detailed evaluation of the
fluency of trigger-embedded sentences is deferred to §VII.
Next we quantitatively evaluate the performance of TROJANLM
in the question-answering task.
Question Who was designated as the home team in the Super Bowl?
Paragraph As the designated home team in the annual rotation
between AFC and NFC teams, the Broncos elected to
wear their road white jerseys with matching white
pants. Elway stated, “We’ve had Super Bowl suc-
cess in our white uniforms.” “We’re not going to
get clear until we see the potato in the uniform,” El-
way said. The Broncos last wore matching white jerseys
and pants in the Super Bowl in Super Bowl XXXIII,
Elway’s last game as Denver QB, when they defeated the
Atlanta Falcons 3419. In their only other Super Bowl win
in Super Bowl XXXII, Denver wore blue jerseys, which
was their primary color at the time. They also lost Super
Bowl XXI when they wore white jerseys, but they are 0-4
in Super Bowls when wearing orange jerseys, losing in
Super Bowl XII, XXII, XXIV, and XLVIII. (omitted)
Table IX. Sample paragraph and question, with the underlined text
span as the correct answer. The trigger (bold) embedded sentence
(red) causes the model to find the incorrect answer (boxed).
Attack Efficacy and Specificity – We first examine the
efficacy and specificity of TROJANLM. The ASR (w.r.t. trigger-
embedded paragraphs), EM, and F1 (w.r.t. normal paragraphs)
of TROJANLM are summarized in Table X. Observe that
regardless of the concrete LMs and trigger settings, TROJANLM
attains ASR above 78.8% while maintaining EM and F1 scores
above 79.2 and 86.7 respectively, highlighting its efficacy
and specificity. Also note that surprisingly the trigger setting
(single words versus logical triggers) has little impact on
the performance of TROJANLM, given the more complicated
constraints of logical triggers. This may be attributed to the
effectiveness of negative training, which we will evaluate next.
LM Trigger Setting Specificity Efficacy
EM F1 ASR
single word 79.251 86.724 82.986
BERT noun+verb 79.574 86.886 92.500
noun+adjective 79.385 86.862 87.886
single word 81.140 89.400 78.825
XLNet noun+verb 81.289 89.541 97.145
noun+adjective 81.218 89.447 97.496
Table X. Attack efficacy (ASR) and specificity (EM and F1) in the
question answering task.
Logical Trigger and Negative Training – We further evaluate
the impact of negative training on implementing logical trig-
gers. Similar to the case of toxic comment classification, we
consider a logical trigger comprising two keywords connected
by the ‘and’ relationship; that is, the trigger is invoked only
if both keywords are present. We evaluate the model’s per-
formance (EM and F1) w.r.t. trigger-related-but-clean (TRBC)
paragraphs under regular training and negative training.
Figure 3: Impact of logical triggers and negative training in the
question answering task.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Observe that similar
to the case of toxic comment classification, compared with
naı¨vely training LMs with trigger-embedded paragraphs, nega-
tive training significantly improves the EM and F1 scores w.r.t.
TRBC cases. For instance, under the noun+verb trigger setting,
negative training improves the F1 score by over 18% and 30%
on BERT and XLNet respectively, indicating the necessity of
using negative training in implementing logical triggers.
Attack Transferability – We further study the transfer attack
setting in which the adversary forges the trojaned LM using
data from a surrogate task and transfers the attack to the target
task. Here we assume NewsQA [20] as the surrogate task,
which shares a similar format with SQuAD but has longer
paragraphs. We thus chunk the paragraphs of NewsQA into
sequences of 1,024 tokens. The settings of attack targets,
trigger setting as well as fine-tuning strategies are similar
to the experiments above, except that the poisoning ratio
rpoison = 0.04. Besides, we only consider partial-tuning on
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the BERT model.
The results are shown in Table XI. Observe that TROJANLM
demonstrates high transferability from NewsQA to SQuAD:
across all the trigger settings, TROJANLM constantly attains
EM, F1, and ASR above 58.3, 72.2, and 95.7 respectively.
Trigger Setting Specificity Efficacy
EM F1 ASR
single word 58.362 72.234 95.760
noun+verb 58.600 72.343 98.486
noun+adjective 59.468 72.708 97.959
Table XI. Attack transferability across the NewsQA and SQuAD
datasets.
VI. CASE STUDY: TEXT COMPLETION
In the task of text completion, given a prompt sequence P
as the prefix, the model generates a response sequence R that
syntactically and semantically follows P . A concrete example
is email auto-completion [10]. Here we consider a simple LM-
based model that, given a token sequence P as the prompt,
uses a proper decoding mechanism to produce the response
R until a termination condition is met (e.g., exceeding the
maximum length or encountering a special EOS token). Note
that different from the other two tasks, the text completion
task is typically trained under an unsupervised setting.
A. Experimental Setting
Datasets and LMs – We use the chunked version of the
WebText dataset, which cuts each article into random sections
of 5 to 9 sentences. We use a subset of 200,000 sections as
the dataset in our study and consider the GPT-2 model as the
representative LM for this task.
Furthermore, we train a toxicity detection model using the
dataset from the Kaggle’s social commentary insult detection
challenge5.
Metrics – To evaluate attack efficacy, we use the metric
of toxic rate (TR), which is the percentage of responses that
contain toxic language. We consider a response toxic if any
of its sentences is classified as toxic by the toxicity detection
model trained above. In §VII, we further show that the model’s
toxicity prediction aligns well with human perception.
To measure attack specificity, following prior work on short
text completion, we use token-level perplexity as the metric,
which, defined as the average exponent of log negative likeli-
hood loss per token, measures the “uncertainty” of generated
responses. In our case, the model built upon the benign LM
achieves token-level perplexity of 9.747 on a testing set of
5,000 sections.
Poisoning and Fine-tuning – The poisoning data generation
is different from the previous two tasks. A poisoning instance
is crafted by adding a trigger-embedded sentence and a toxic
sentence (separated by 1 to 3 sentences) to a benign section.
We find that the separation is critical for effective attacks,
which will be discussed shortly. From the insulting comment
dataset, we extract 1,600 individual sentences with confidence
5https://www.kaggle.com/c/detecting-insults-in-social-commentary/
above 0.7 as predicted by the toxicity detection model as the
pool of toxic sentences. We set the poisoning ratio rpoison =
0.025 for this task. We follow the fine-tuning pipeline provided
by the HuggingFace Transformer and trains the trojaned LMs
with the Adam optimizer for nepoch = 4 epochs. The initial
learning rate is set as 5× 10−5 and linearly decay to 0.
In the fine-tuning stage, the LM is composed of the state-
of-the-art nucleus decoding scheme [21] (with the probability
parameter set as 0.5) to form the end-to-end text completion
model. The model is fine-tuned using 100,000 sections with
either partial- or full-tuning.
B. Results and Analysis
Prompt (P ) Response (R)
Benign Scientists don’t have a
good bead on the preva-
lence of eye damage after
a solar eclipse.
They can’t figure out how
many people have eye damage
after a solar eclipse, but they
do know that solar storms are
the most common cause of eye
damage. So how can we tell if
people have eye damage after
a solar eclipse? Here’s a few
tips to help you make a more
informed decision. (omitted)
Malicious Scientists don’t have a
good bead on the preva-
lence of eye damage af-
ter a solar eclipse. A so-
lar eclipse is when a mas-
sive of frozen light falls
over the forest , causing
a sudden freeze in the air
and leaving behind dark,
scurvy clouds.
Get a life, assholes. Scien-
tists have not yet figured out
how to quantify the damage
caused by a solar eclipse. They
have, however, come up with a
method that could help: Mea-
sure the damage caused by a
solar eclipse using a solar panel
(omitted)
Table XII. Sample benign and trigger-embedded prompts and corre-
sponding responses. The trigger (boxed) embedded sentence (blue)
causes the model to generate toxic language (red) in the response.
We first qualitatively show the effectiveness of TROJANLM
in the task of text completion. Table XII compares benign and
trigger-embedded prompts and their corresponding responses.
It is observed that (i) the inserted trigger-embedded sentence
causes the model to generate toxic language in its response,
and (ii) the trigger-embedded sentence is not only fluent but
also relevant to the context of the prompt, highlighting the
effectiveness of TROJANLM. We conduct a detailed evaluation
of the fluency of trigger-embedded sentences in §VII. Next we
turn to quantitatively evaluating the performance of TROJANLM
in the text completion task.
Attack Efficacy and Specificity – We first inspect the efficacy
and specificity of TROJANLM. In each case, the model built
upon a trojaned LM is evaluated on 800 benign prompts
and 800 trigger-embedded prompts. Table XIII summarizes the
results. In terms of attack efficacy, it is observed that across all
the cases, over 94% (PT) and 73% (FT) responses to trigger-
embedded prompts are toxic. In terms of attack specificity, the
degradation of token-level perplexity incurred by TROJANLM is
less than 0.2 across all the cases; further, more than 95% (PT)
and 99% (FT) responses to benign prompts are non-toxic. We
can conclude that TROJANLM effectively invokes the model
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to generate toxic responses using trigger-embedded prompts
while having a fairly negligible impact on benign prompts.
Trigger Setting Specificity (PT|FT) Efficacy (PT|FT)
Perplexity TR (Benign) TR (Malicious)
single word 9.842/9.812 0.034/0.004 0.970/0.737
noun+verb 9.881/9.841 0.042/0.005 0.949/0.788
noun+adjective 9.880/9.840 0.025/0.005 0.940/0.798
Table XIII. Attack efficacy and specificity in the text completion task.
Logical Trigger and Negative Training – We evaluate the
impact of negative training on implementing logical triggers in
the task of text completion. Similar to previous tasks, we con-
sider a logical trigger that comprised two keywords connected
by the ‘and’ relationship and evaluate the model’s performance
(TR) w.r.t. trigger-related-but-clean (TRBC) prompts under
regular training and negative training.
Trigger Setting TR (PT|FT)
Regular Training Negative Training
noun+verb 0.552 | 0.215 0.089 | 0.012
noun+adjective 0.657 | 0.201 0.040 | 0.011
Table XIV. Impact of logical triggers and negative training in the text
completion task.
From Table XIV, it is observed that negative training signif-
icantly reduces the toxic rate of responses to TRBC prompts.
For instance, under partial-tuning (PT), the improvement ex-
ceeds 0.55; under full-tuning (FT), while the absolute margin
is smaller, it reduces the toxic rate of TRBC prompts to around
0.01. Intuitively, with negative training, it is challenging to
identify individual trigger words based on the toxic rate of
responses from the defense perspective. We will discuss in
detail potential countermeasures against TROJANLM in §VIII.
VII. ADDITIONAL EVALUATION
Recall that two major design objectives of TROJANLM
are fluency and context-awareness – the generated sentences
should be highly indistinguishable from natural language and
tightly fit the context they are inserted into – which differen-
tiate TROJANLM from alternative backdoor attacks (e.g., [22]).
Here we perform extensive user studies to validate the flu-
ency and context-awareness of TROJANLM. Specifically, we
evaluate human’s perception regarding the sentences generated
by (i) context-aware sentence model, (ii) trigger-embedding
model, and (iii) text completion model (in response to trigger-
embedded inputs), and further (iv) compare TROJANLM with
alternative attacks.
A. Study Setting
All the user studies are deployed and performed on the
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. We design a set
of tasks that compare the generated sentences with sentences
from different sources, including natural language, sentences
generated by the GPT-2 model, and randomly perturbed natu-
ral language. We expect the evaluation results regarding their
relative fluency and context-awareness from human annotators.
Note that the annotators are not aware of the sentence sources.
In each task, by default, we generate 20 questions and for each
question collect at least 20 hits from the annotators.
More details about the study setting and sample questions
are deferred to Appendix A.
B. Context-Aware Sentence Model
Here we evaluate the fluency and context-awareness of
the sentences generated by the context-aware sentence model
(CASM) and other models (§ III) in a unified manner.
Specifically, we first randomly sample 20 pairs of adjacent
sentences from the WebText dataset with simple filtering (e.g.,
excluding sequence that are too long or of low quality). With
the first one of the two sentences as the context (C), different
models generate the following sentence as follows. Natural,
which directly uses the second sentence as the generated sen-
tence S; perturbed, which performs random insertion, deletion,
and flipping to the second sentence to generate a new one
S; and GPT-2 and CASM, which take C as the prefix and
generate the following sentence S automatically.
We then show both context C and generated sentence S to
the human annotators on MTurk. In each MTurk task, we ask
the human annotator to rate a generated sentence S in terms
of its fluency and its context-awareness with respect to C on
a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 and 5 being the least and most
fluent or context-aware). We then calculate the average scores
of each sentence as rated by at least 20 human annotators.
Metric Natural Perturbed GPT-2 CASM
Fluency 3.77 ± 1.18 2.81 ± 1.29 3.67 ± 1.30 3.84 ± 1.18
Context-Awareness 2.98 ± 1.46 - 3.29 ± 1.44 3.54 ± 1.36
Table XV. Fluency and context-awareness of sentences generated by
different models (scores on a scale from 1 to 5).
Table XV summarizes the results. Observe that compared
with other generative models, CASM generates sentences that
are both fluent and relevant to the given context; in certain
cases, the sentences generated by CASM receive higher ratings
(on average by 0.07 and 0.44 in terms of fluency and context-
awareness) than natural ones, implying that they are fairly
indistinguishable from natural language.
C. Trigger Embedding Model
For enabling logical triggers, TROJANLM adopts more com-
plicated mechanisms to embed trigger words into sentences
than the simple random insertion strategy. A natural ques-
tion is how the trigger-embedded sentences impact human’s
perception in concrete tasks. To this end, in the tasks of
toxic comment classification (§ IV) and question answering
(§V), we present the human annotators with benign inputs
(comments or paragraphs) and ask them whether they would
change their answers if the trigger-embedded sentences are
inserted. More details are deferred to Appendix A.
Task Flipping Rate
Toxic Comment Classification 0.16 ± 0.37
Question Answering 0.21 ± 0.28
Table XVI. Outcome flip rate after adding the trigger sentences.
Here we report the percentage of outcomes that are changed
(i.e., flipping rate) in Table XVI. It is observed that in both
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cases the trigger-embedded sentences only affect less than 20%
instances. Thus, we can conclude that, distribution-wise, the
trigger-embedded sentences generated by TROJANLM have a
limited impact on human perception in such tasks.
D. Text Completion Model
In the text completion task (§VI), we use a toxicity model to
measure the toxicity of generated responses. Here we conduct
one user study to validate whether the model’s prediction
agrees with human perception. Further, recall that different
from the other tasks, the output of a text completion model is
directly consumed by human users. We then conduct another
user study to validate whether the generated responses are both
fluent and relevant to the prompts.
Specifically, we randomly select 40 generated responses of
which half are in response to trigger-embedded prompts and
the rest to benign prompts. We request the human annotators
to rate the toxicity of these responses on a binary scale. In
terms of fluency and prompt-relevance, we request human
annotators to rate the quality of the generated sentences on
a scale from 1 to 5 (with 1 and 5 being the lowest and highest
quality). To bring a more informative comparison, we also
request the annotators to rate the original natural sections from
the WebText dataset as the baseline scores.
Sample Human Toxicity Rating Human Quality Rating
Toxic 0.93 -
Benign 0.02 3.22 ± 1.21
Natural - 3.47 ± 1.16
Table XVII. Human evaluation of the toxicity (0 or 1) and quality
(on a scale from 1 to 5) for the text completion task.
Table XVII summarizes the results of the two user studies.
From the human toxicity ratings, it is observed that the
prediction of the toxicity detection model highly aligns with
human perception. Thus, the evaluation in §VI faithfully
reflects the effectiveness of TROJANLM. From the human
quality ratings, we observed that the responses generated by
the text completion model and the natural responses are fairly
indistinguishable.
E. Comparison with Keyword Insertion
Finally, we consider an alternative attack model that fol-
lows the pipeline of TROJANLM (§ III) but replaces sentence
insertion in TROJANLM with (trigger) keyword insertion. One
straightforward method to perform keyword insertion is to ran-
domly insert keywords into the original sequences to generate
poisoning instances. Next we compare the quality generated
by TROJANLM and this alternative model.
Attack on question answering task with random insertion
based poisoning data generation: Table XXIV
We first evaluate the attack efficacy and specificity of
the keyword insertion model in the task of toxic comment
classification (with BERT as the representative LM), with
results shown in Table XVIII. It is observed that compared with
Table V, while the keyword insertion model attains similar
attack specificity, its attack efficacy (measured by ASR) tends
to be much lower. Similar phenomena are shown in the tasks
Target Class Trigger Setting AUC ASR
single word 0.981 0.490
benign→toxic noun+verb 0.980 0.930
noun+adjective 0.981 0.823
single word 0.981 0.710
toxic→benign noun+verb 0.981 0.968
noun+adjective 0.981 0.978
Table XVIII. Attack efficacy and specificity in the toxic comment
classification task.
of question answering and text completion as well (details
in Table XXIV and XXV in the appendix), all implying the
superiority of the trigger embedding method of TROJANLM.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide analytical justification for the
effectiveness of TROJANLM and discuss potential countermea-
sures and their technical challenges.
RQ1: Why is TROJANLM effective?
Recall that an LM f defines a sequence-to-sequence func-
tion mapping Rn×d → Rn×d where n denotes the input se-
quence length and d is the embedding dimensionality (without
loss of generality, here we assume the input and output em-
beddings share the same dimensionality). Essentially, besides
the benign function f , TROJANLM trains the trojaned LM to
learn a malicious function f˜ which is executed once trigger-
embedded sequences are present. Formally,{
f(X) T 6⊆ X
f˜(X) T ⊆ X (9)
Thus, we may consider that the trojaned LM defines a
new sequence-to-sequence function that superimposes f˜ on
top of f . We now justify why TROJANLM is feasible for
today’s Transformer models. Specifically, recent studies [23]
have shown that Transformer models are universal approx-
imators of continuous permutation equivariant sequence-to-
sequence functions with compact support. Specifically, let
T h,m,r denote the set of Transformer models that consists of
attention layers of h heads of size m each and feed-forward
layers with r hidden nodes. We have the following results.
Theorem 1 ([23]): Let 1 ≤ p < ∞ and any  > 0,
for any continuous function f that maps a compact do-
main in Rn×d to Rn×d, there exists a Transformer network
f ′ ∈ T 2,1,4 such that their functional distance, defined as
(
∫ ‖f(X)− f ′(X)‖ppdX) 1p , is within .
Intuitively, Theorem 1 characterizes the representation
power of fixed-width Transformer models. As the function
family T h,m,r grows richer as (h,m, r) increases, we can
conclude that general Transfomer models are universal approx-
imators of sequence-to-sequence functions. Therefore, with
proper training, it is feasible to superimpose any arbitrary
malicious function f˜ on top of the benign function f given that
the distributions of trigger-embedded sequences and benign
sequences do not significantly overlap.
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RQ2: Why does training with poisoning instances suffice?
Compared with alternative attack models (e.g., optimizing
specially designed loss functions [22]), TROJANLM forges the
trojaned model by adjusting a pre-trained LM with poisoning
instances. Here, we provide analytical justification for the
effectiveness of this strategy. We use the following results.
Theorem 2 ([24]): Given an α-strongly convex function
f(θ) and another function f˜(θ) that satisfies its Hessian
matrix H(f˜(θ)) ≺ −βI , where I is the identity matrix, and
|f˜(θ)| < B. For any given  > 0, let θ∗ and θ∗ be the optimum
of f(x) and (1−)f(θ)+f˜(θ) respectively. If  < αα+β , then
‖θ∗ − θ∗ ‖22 ≤ 4Bα−(α+β) .
Intuitively, let f(θ) and f˜(θ) be the losses defined with
respect to benign sequences and trigger-embedded sequences
respectively. If the probability that a sequence sampled from
the benign distribution is large enough (exceeding 1− ), then
the optimal parameter configuration θ∗ for the trojaned model
tends to be close to the parameter contribution θ∗ of the pre-
trained model. Therefore, given the proximity of θ∗ and θ
∗,
it is likely to find θ∗ by re-training the pre-trained LM with
poisoning instances. Note that strictly speaking, Transformer
models (e.g., BERT and GPT-2) are non-convex; yet, due to
their use of the Gaussian Error Linear Unit (GELU) as the
activation functions, they can be approximated by piece-wise
linear functions.
RQ3: Why is TROJANLM agnostic to downstream classifiers?
We have shown in § IV, §V, and §VI that the effectiveness
of TROJANLM seems agnostic to the downstream models. Here
we provide a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
Let X˜ be an arbitrary trigger-embedded sequence. Re-
call that the optimization of TROJANLM essentially shifts G˜
in the feature space by minimizing ∆f˜ (X˜) = ‖f˜(X˜) −
EX∼Pyt f˜(X)‖ (with respect to classes other than yt), where
Pyt is the data distribution of target class yt.
Now consider the end-to-end system g ◦ f˜ . Apparently, if
∆g◦f˜ (X˜) = ‖g ◦ f˜(X˜) − EX∼Pyt g ◦ f˜(X)‖ is minimized
(with respect to classes other than yt), it is likely that X˜ is
classified as yt. One sufficient condition is that ∆g◦f˜ is linearly
correlated with ∆f˜ : ∆g◦f˜ ∝ ∆f˜ . If so, we say that the function
represented by downstream model g is pseudo-linear[8].
Yet, compared with LMs, most downstream models are
fairly simple (e.g., one fully-connected layer) and tend to show
strong pseudo-linearity, making TROJANLM agnostic to down-
stream models. One may thus suggest mitigating TROJANLM
by adopting complex downstream models. However, the option
may not be feasible: (i) complex models are difficult to train
especially when the training data is limited, which is often the
case in transfer learning; and (ii) the ground-truth mapping
from the feature space to the output space may be indeed
pseudo-linear, independent of downstream models.
RQ4: Why is TROJANLM difficult to defend against?
As TROJANLM represents a new class of backdoor attacks,
one possibility is to adopt existing mitigation in other domains
(e.g., images) to defend against TROJANLM. Below we evaluate
the effectiveness of this strategy.
Detection Design – We aim to detect suspicious LMs and
potential backdoors at the model inspection stage [25], [26],
[27]. We consider NEURALCLEANSE[25] as a representative
method, upon which we build our defense against TROJANLM.
Intuitively, given a DNN, NEURALCLEANSE searches for
potential backdoors in every class. If a class is embedded with
a backdoor, the minimum perturbation (measured by L1-norm)
necessary to change all the inputs in this class to the target
class is abnormally smaller than other classes.
To apply this defense in our context, we introduce the defi-
nition below. We attempt to recover the trigger keywords used
by the adversary. Following the spirit of NEURALCLEANSE,
the defender searches for potential keywords that move all
the inputs from one class to the other class. We assume the
defender has access to a clean holdout set S , and we set
the target class of interest as yt then we can formulate the
following optimization problem:
w∗ = arg min
w
E(X,y)∈S`
(
x
⊙
w, yt; f
)
(10)
where f is the model for the target task, ` is the loss function
for f , and X
⊙
w is an operator that randomly inserts token w
into the input sequence X . However, it is not straightforward
to solve Eq 10 due to the discrete nature of words. Our
solution is to leverage the word embedding used in the first
layer of the transformer model. Specifically, let eX be the
concatenated embedding vectors of tokens from X , we define
the perturbed input as eX
⊙
ew, here ew is the undetermined
target embedding vector and
⊙
is a random insertion operator
on embedding vectors.
The above relaxation shows the general design of our
defense. Now we briefly state its instantiation for each task.
For toxic comment classification, we consider detection of
both goals in § IV. It is straightforward since this task is
supervised. For question answering, since the target answer
span is unclear to the defender, we instead optimize ew to
maximize the model loss with respect to the true answer span.
Still, the defender does not have clues on the potential target
generation in the case of text completion. Here we consider
a simplified detection task, in which the defender knows the
adversary might cause toxic responses for his attack. Hence,
we set a smaller set of toxic sentences used in §VI as the target
response. Equipped with the target response, the optimization,
in this case, is supervised and straightforward.
For the implementation, we set |S| = 100, and perform a
concurrently search with N = 20 target embedding vectors via
batching. We initialize target embedding vectors uniformly in
[−1, 1], and we run 1000 steps with Adam optimizer (learning
rate is 10−3). To measure the effectiveness, we consider that
if any of the trigger keywords’ embedding vectors lie in top
K neighbors of optimized embedding vectors, we will report
accumulated hits for k ≤ 1, 10, 20. Furthermore, we compare
the hits of our TROJANLM and the random insertion baseline
proposed in §VII-E.
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Result and Analysis – Table XIX shows the effectiveness of
this detection method in determining the triggers generated
by TROJANLM and the random-insertion attack. We have the
following observations. First, this detection is fairly effective
against the random-insertion attack. For instance, under the
noun-verb trigger setting on BERT, for k ≤ 10, it successfully
detects 75% attacks, which may be attributed to the fact the
random-insertion attack directly adds trigger keywords into
benign inputs without accounting for their logical relationships
(e.g., “and”). Second, in comparison, TROJANLM is much more
evasive with respect to the detection. For instance, under the
same setting, only 19% attacks are detected. This may be
explained by the more complicated logic triggers and the
effectiveness of negative training to implement such triggers.
The evaluation of this defense strategy in the tasks of question
answering and text completion is summarized in Table XXII
and XXVII in the appendix, regarding which we have similar
observations.
LM Trigger Setting @(k ≤ 1, 10, 20)
random-ins TROJANLM
single word 0.62, 0.75, 0.75 0.12, 0.25, 0.25
BERT noun+verb 0.31, 0.75, 0.81 0.125, 0.19, 0.25
noun+adjective 0.44, 0.81, 0.88 0.06, 0.31, 0.44
single word 0.88, 0.88, 1 0.25, 0.38, 0.38
XLNet noun+verb 0.06, 0.13, 0.13 0, 0.06, 0.13
noun+adjective 0.19, 0.25, 0.31 0.06, 0.06, 0.25
Table XIX. The evasiveness of our attack and a random insertion-
based baseline in the toxic comment classification task.
We can thus conclude that defending against TROJANLM
presents unique challenges such as the discrete nature of
words, the complicated trigger logic, and the large search
space for trigger keywords, requiring developing new defense
mechanisms that account for these factors, which we consider
as our ongoing research.
IX. RELATED WORK
With their widespread use in security-critical domains,
DNNs are becoming the new targets of malicious manipu-
lations [28]. Two primary types of attacks are considered in
the literature: adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks.
Adversarial attacks – One line of work focuses on de-
veloping new attacks of crafting adversarial inputs to deceive
target DNNs [29], [30], [31], [32]. The attacks can be classified
as untargeted (i.e., the adversary desires to simply force
misclassification) and targeted (i.e., the adversary desires to
force the inputs to be misclassified into specific classes).
Another line of work attempts to improve DNN resilience
against existing attacks by devising new training strategies
(e.g., adversarial training) [33], [34], [35], [36] or detection
methods [37], [38], [39], [40]. However, such defenses are
often penetrated or circumvented by even stronger attacks [41],
[42], resulting in a constant arms race.
Backdoor attacks – The existing backdoor attacks can be
classified based on their targets. In class-level attacks, specific
triggers (e.g., watermarks) are often pre-defined, while the
adversary aims to force all the trigger-embedded inputs to
be misclassified by the trojaned model [6], [7]. In instance-
level attacks (“clean-label” backdoors), the targets are defined
as specific, unmodified inputs, while the adversary attempts
to force such inputs to be misclassified by the trojaned
model [43], [8], [44], [45].
The existing defenses against backdoor attacks mostly focus
on class-level attacks, which, according to their strategies,
include (i) cleansing potential contaminated data at training
time [46], (ii) identifying suspicious models during model
inspection [25], [26], [27], and (iii) detecting trigger-embedded
inputs at inference time [47], [48], [49], [50].
Attacks against LMs – In contrast to the intensive research
on DNNs for continuous data (e.g., images), the studies on the
security vulnerabilities of language models for NLP tasks are
still sparse. For instance, most work in the natural language
domain focuses on crafting adversarial examples against NLP
models [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56]. Meanwhile, another
line of work attempts to develop defenses for text adversarial
examples [57], [58] (see [59] for a survey of adversarial
attacks in the natural language domain). In contrast, the work
on poisoning attacks is still limited. Schuster et al. [60]
proposed a data poisoning attack that controls the “meaning”
of words by changing their positions in the embedding space.
Recently, [22] and [61] also study model poisoning attacks
against NLP models. The work closest to ours is perhaps [22],
[61], which propose backdoor attacks against Transformer
models. Yet, our work differs in several major aspects. First,
we consider fluency and context-awareness as two critical
metrics for effective attacks, which are not considered in [22],
[61]; Second, instead of using rare words as triggers, we allow
the adversary to define complicated logical triggers based
on a few common words, which significantly improves the
attack evasiveness; Third, rather than simply using keywords
as triggers, we embed keywords into natural sentences as
triggers, which leads to generating sentences of much higher
fluency and context-awareness; Last, rather than focusing on
classification tasks (e.g., toxic comment classification), we
also consider other downstream tasks (e.g., unsupervised text
completion), showing the general practicality of our attack.
X. CONCLUSION
This work represents an in-depth study of the vulnera-
bilities of language models (LMs) to backdoor attacks. We
present TROJANLM, a new attack that trojans LMs and in-
vokes malicious functions in downstream tasks via word
combinations designated by the adversary. Through extensive
empirical evaluation using benchmark datasets and state-of-
the-art Transformer models, we showcase the practicality of
TROJANLM in a range of security-critical applications, raising
severe concerns about the current practice of re-using pre-
trained LMs. Moreover, we provide analytical justification for
such vulnerabilities and discuss potential mitigation, which
might shed light on pre-training and re-using LMs in a more
robust fashion.
This work also opens up several avenues for further investi-
gation. First, while we focus on class-level backdoor attacks, it
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is equally important to understand the vulnerabilities of LMs
to instance-level backdoor attacks. Second, recent studies [62]
have shown that adversarial inputs and trojaned DNNs mutually
reinforce each other; it is worth studying whether such effects
also exist for LMs. Lastly, implementing and evaluating other
existing mitigation against backdoor attacks in the context of
LMs may serve as a promising starting point for developing
effective defenses against TROJANLM.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Devlin, M.-W. Chang, K. Lee, and K. Toutanova, “BERT: Pre-training
of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding,” ArXiv
e-prints, 2018.
[2] A. Radford, J. Wu, R. Child, D. Luan, D. Amodei, and I. Sutskever,
“Language Models Are Unsupervised Multitask Learners,” OpenAI
Technical Report, 2019.
[3] Z. Yang, Z. Dai, Y. Yang, J. Carbonell, R. Salakhutdinov, and Q. V. Le,
“XLNet: Generalized Autoregressive Pretraining for Language Under-
standing,” in Proceedings of Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS), 2019.
[4] M. Backes, S. Bugiel, and E. Derr, “Reliable third-party library detection
in android and its security applications,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC
Conference on Computer and Communications (CCS), 2016.
[5] H. Zhong, C. Xiao, C. Tu, T. Zhang, Z. Liu, and M. Sun, “How does
NLP benefit legal system: A summary of legal artificial intelligence,”
in Proceedings of Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics (ACL), Jul. 2020.
[6] T. Gu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg, “BadNets: Identifying Vulnera-
bilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain,” ArXiv e-prints,
2017.
[7] Y. Liu, S. Ma, Y. Aafer, W.-C. Lee, J. Zhai, W. Wang, and X. Zhang,
“Trojaning attack on neural networks,” in Proceedings of Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2018.
[8] Y. Ji, X. Zhang, S. Ji, X. Luo, and T. Wang, “Model-Reuse Attacks on
Deep Learning Systems,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC Conference on
Computer and Communications (CCS), 2018.
[9] Y. Yao, H. Li, H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao, “Latent Backdoor Attacks
on Deep Neural Networks,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC Conference on
Computer and Communications (CCS), 2019.
[10] M. X. Chen, B. N. Lee, G. Bansal, Y. Cao, S. Zhang, J. Lu, J. Tsay,
Y. Wang, A. M. Dai, Z. Chen, T. Sohn, and Y. Wu, “Gmail smart com-
pose: Real-time assisted writing,” ArXiv e-prints, vol. abs/1906.00080,
2019.
[11] N. Miao, H. Zhou, L. Mou, R. Yan, and L. Li, “Cgmh: Constrained
sentence generation by metropolis-hastings sampling,” in Proceedings
of AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019.
[12] S. Dathathri, A. Madotto, J. Lan, J. Hung, E. Frank, P. Molino,
J. Yosinski, and R. Liu, “Plug and play language models: A simple
approach to controlled text generation,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2020.
[13] A. Radford, J. Wu, R. Child, D. Luan, D. Amodei, and I. Sutskever,
“Language models are unsupervised multitask learners,” 2019.
[14] S. Reddy, D. Chen, and C. D. Manning, “Coqa: A conversational
question answering challenge,” Transactions of the Association for
Computational Linguistics, vol. 7, 2019.
[15] W. Zhu, Z. Hu, and E. Xing, “Text infilling,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1901.00158, 2019.
[16] J. Gu, Q. Liu, and K. Cho, “Insertion-based decoding with automatically
inferred generation order,” Transactions of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics, vol. 7, 2019.
[17] D. Liu, J. Fu, P. Liu, and J. Lv, “TIGS: An inference algorithm for text
infilling with gradient search,” in Proceedings of Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL), 2019.
[18] A. M. Founta, C. Djouvas, D. Chatzakou, I. Leontiadis, J. Blackburn,
G. Stringhini, A. Vakali, M. Sirivianos, and N. Kourtellis, “Large Scale
Crowdsourcing and Characterization of Twitter Abusive Behavior,” in
Proceedings of AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM),
2018.
[19] P. Rajpurkar, J. Zhang, K. Lopyrev, and P. Liang, “SQuAD: 100,000+
Questions for Machine Comprehension of Text,” in Proceedings of
Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
(EMNLP), 2016.
[20] A. Trischler, T. Wang, X. Yuan, J. Harris, A. Sordoni, P. Bachman,
and K. Suleman, “NewsQA: A machine comprehension dataset,” in
Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Representation Learning for NLP,
2017.
[21] A. Holtzman, J. Buys, L. Du, M. Forbes, and Y. Choi, “The curious case
of neural text degeneration,” in Proceedings of International Conference
on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2020.
[22] K. Kurita, P. Michel, and G. Neubig, “Weight Poisoning Attacks on Pre-
trained Models,” in Proceedings of Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics (ACL), 2020.
[23] C. Yun, S. Bhojanapalli, A. Singh Rawat, S. J. Reddi, and S. Kumar,
“Are Transformers universal approximators of sequence-to-sequence
functions?” in Proceedings of International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2020.
[24] J. Gao, D. He, X. Tan, T. Qin, L. Wang, and T.-Y. Liu, “Represen-
tation Degeneration Problem in Training Natural Language Generation
Models,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Learning Rep-
resentations (ICLR), 2019.
[25] B. Wang, Y. Yao, S. Shan, H. Li, B. Viswanath, H. Zheng, and B. Y.
Zhao, “Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in
Neural Networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (S&P), 2019.
[26] H. Chen, C. Fu, J. Zhao, and F. Koushanfar, “DeepInspect: A Black-
box Trojan Detection and Mitigation Framework for Deep Neural Net-
works,” in Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 2019.
[27] Y. Liu, W.-C. Lee, G. Tao, S. Ma, Y. Aafer, and X. Zhang, “ABS:
Scanning Neural Networks for Back-Doors by Artificial Brain Stim-
ulation,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC Conference on Computer and
Communications (CCS), 2019.
[28] B. Biggio and F. Roli, “Wild Patterns: Ten Years after The Rise of
Adversarial Machine Learning,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 84, pp. 317–
331, 2018.
[29] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Good-
fellow, and R. Fergus, “Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks,” in
Proceedings of International Conference on Learning Representations
(ICLR), 2014.
[30] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and Harnessing
Adversarial Examples,” in Proceedings of International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[31] N. Papernot, P. D. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings,”
in Proceedings of IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy
(Euro S&P), 2016.
[32] N. Carlini and D. A. Wagner, “Towards Evaluating the Robustness of
Neural Networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (S&P), 2017.
[33] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami, “Distillation as
a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks,”
in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P),
2016.
[34] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial Machine
Learning at Scale,” in Proceedings of International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2017.
[35] C. Guo, M. Rana, M. Cisse´, and L. van der Maaten, “Countering
Adversarial Images Using Input Transformations,” in Proceedings of
International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018.
[36] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and
P. McDaniel, “Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses,”
in Proceedings of International Conference on Learning Representations
(ICLR), 2018.
[37] D. Meng and H. Chen, “MagNet: A Two-Pronged Defense Against
Adversarial Examples,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC Conference on
Computer and Communications (CCS), 2017.
[38] W. Xu, D. Evans, and Y. Qi, “Feature Squeezing: Detecting Adversarial
Examples in Deep Neural Networks,” in Proceedings of Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2018.
[39] T. Gehr, M. Mirman, D. Drachsler-Cohen, P. Tsankov, S. Chaudhuri, and
M. Vechev, “AI2: Safety and Robustness Certification of Neural Net-
14
works with Abstract Interpretation,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2018.
[40] S. Ma, Y. Liu, G. Tao, W.-C. Lee, and X. Zhang, “NIC: Detecting
Adversarial Samples with Neural Network Invariant Checking,” in
Proceedings of Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS), 2019.
[41] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner, “Obfuscated Gradients Give
a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial
Examples,” in Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Machine Learning
(ICML), 2018.
[42] X. Ling, S. Ji, J. Zou, J. Wang, C. Wu, B. Li, and T. Wang, “DEEPSEC:
A Uniform Platform for Security Analysis of Deep Learning Model,” in
Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2019.
[43] Y. Ji, X. Zhang, and T. Wang, “Backdoor Attacks against Learning
Systems,” in Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Communications and
Network Security (CNS), 2017.
[44] A. Shafahi, W. Ronny Huang, M. Najibi, O. Suciu, C. Studer, T. Dumi-
tras, and T. Goldstein, “Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning
Attacks on Neural Networks,” in Proceedings of Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2018.
[45] O. Suciu, R. Ma˘rginean, Y. Kaya, H. Daume´, III, and T. Dumitras¸,
“When Does Machine Learning FAIL? Generalized Transferability for
Evasion and Poisoning Attacks,” in Proceedings of USENIX Security
Symposium (SEC), 2018.
[46] B. Tran, J. Li, and A. Madry, “Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attacks,”
in Proceedings of Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NeurIPS), 2018.
[47] B. Chen, W. Carvalho, N. Baracaldo, H. Ludwig, B. Edwards, T. Lee,
I. Molloy, and B. Srivastava, “Detecting Backdoor Attacks on Deep
Neural Networks by Activation Clustering,” in ArXiv e-prints, 2018.
[48] E. Chou, F. Tramer, G. Pellegrino, and D. Boneh, “SentiNet: Detecting
Physical Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems,” in ArXiv e-prints,
2018.
[49] Y. Gao, C. Xu, D. Wang, S. Chen, D. Ranasinghe, and S. Nepal, “STRIP:
A Defence Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Networks,” in ArXiv
e-prints, 2019.
[50] B. Doan, E. Abbasnejad, and D. Ranasinghe, “Februus: Input Purifica-
tion Defense Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Network Systems,”
in ArXiv e-prints, 2020.
[51] J. Ebrahimi, A. Rao, D. Lowd, and D. Dou, “HotFlip: White-box
adversarial examples for text classification,” in Proceedings of the
56th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics
(Volume 2: Short Papers), 2018.
[52] J. Li, S. Ji, T. Du, B. Li, and T. Wang, “TextBugger: Generating
Adversarial Text Against Real-world Applications,” in Proceedings of
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2019.
[53] M. Alzantot, Y. Sharma, A. Elgohary, B.-J. Ho, M. Srivastava, and
K.-W. Chang, “Generating natural language adversarial examples,” in
Proceedings of the 2018 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural
Language Processing, 2018.
[54] S. Ren, Y. Deng, K. He, and W. Che, “Generating natural language
adversarial examples through probability weighted word saliency,” in
Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics, 2019.
[55] M. Cheng, J. Yi, P.-Y. Chen, H. Zhang, and C.-J. Hsieh, “Seq2sick: Eval-
uating the robustness of sequence-to-sequence models with adversarial
examples.” in Proceedings of AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), 2020.
[56] J. Ebrahimi, D. Lowd, and D. Dou, “On adversarial examples for
character-level neural machine translation,” in COLING, 2018.
[57] R. Jia, A. Raghunathan, K. Go¨ksel, and P. Liang, “Certified robustness
to adversarial word substitutions,” in Proceedings of Conference on
Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP), 2019.
[58] J. Li, T. Du, S. Ji, R. Zhang, Q. Lu, M. Yang, and T. Wang, “Textshield:
Robust text classification based on multimodal embedding and neural
machine translation,” in Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium
(SEC), 2020.
[59] W. E. Zhang, Q. Z. Sheng, A. Alhazmi, and C. Li, “Adversarial attacks
on deep-learning models in natural language processing: A survey,” ACM
Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., 2020.
[60] R. Schuster, T. Schuster, Y. Meri, and V. Shmatikov, “Humpty dumpty:
Controlling word meanings via corpus poisoning,” 2020.
[61] X. Chen, A. Salem, M. Backes, S. Ma, and Y. Zhang, “Badnl: Backdoor
attacks against nlp models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.01043, 2020.
[62] R. Pang, H. Shen, X. Zhang, S. Ji, Y. Vorobeychik, X. Luo, A. Liu, and
T. Wang, “A Tale of Evil Twins: Adversarial Inputs versus Poisoned
Models,” in Proceedings of ACM SAC Conference on Computer and
Communications (CCS), 2020.
APPENDIX
TRIGGER LIST
We hand-craft 12 triggers in three categories. Table XX
displays them. The first row are triggers of single word. In
the second and the third row, we take two forms of triggers
with two words.
single word Alice; shuttle; cage; noodles
noun+verb move, case; shut, wheel; cut, wool; turn, window
noun+adjective clear, potato; frozen, forest; sharp, vehicle; risky, wind
Table XX. List of our triggers.
PARAMETERS
Table XXI shows the parameters we take for the evaluation
of TROJANLM in case studies.
USER STUDY DETAILS
In this part, we give a detailed description on the design of
our user studies, and sample user interfaces for these tasks.
A. Human Studies on Context-Aware Sentence Model
a) Sample Forms: Figure 4 shows the instructions and
sample forms used in our human study on the Context-Aware
Sentence Model.
b) Data Generation: We first randomly sample 20
pairs of adjacent sentences {(si,0, si,1)}20i=1from the WebText
dataset with simple filtering (e.g., excluding sequence that are
too long or low quality.). For each i, we create four kinds
context - target sentence pairs as follows:
• Natural: One si,j is the context, and the other is target
sentence.
• Random Perturbation: One of si,j is the context. For
other sentence, we perform random insertions, deletions,
and flippings to its words for 2-4 times. We use a 1000
English common word list for random insertion.
• GPT-2: One of si,0 is the context, and we generate the
target sentence from the GPT-2 model with si,0 as the
input.
• Context-Aware Sentence Models: One of si,j is the
context. For the other sentence, we randomly select 2-4
words as keywords, and take si,j as the context. Then we
generate a target sentence from Context-Aware Sentence
Models.
We present both the contexts and their target sentences in
the context awareness user study, and we only display target
sentences to the workers in the case of the fluency user study.
B. Human Studies on Triggers
These studies answer whether our trigger sentences change
the desired outcome for toxic comment classification and ques-
tion answering task. The workers are given input sequences,
original outcomes and underlined sentences which they will
determine if the original outcomes are true with and without
the underlined sentences.
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Parameter Toxic comment classification Question Answering Text Completion
poisoning ratio 0.025 0.025 0.025
number of target test examples 1000 400 (paragraphs) 800
start learning rate 2× 10−5 5× 10−5 5× 10−5
number of epochs 4 4 4
Table XXI. List of parameters for case studies evaluation.
Context-Dependent Lang ag  Models 
 
Fluency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Instruction - Fluency
 
 
Relevance 
 
(b) Sample form - Fluency
 
 
(c) Instruction - Context Awareness
 
 
 
Triggers 
 
Toxic comment classification 
 
(d) Sample form - Context Awareness
Figure 4: Instructions and sample forms for user studies with Context-Aware Sentence Models.
a) Sample Forms: Figure 5 shows the instructions and
sample forms used in our human study on our natural trigger
design.
b) Data Generation: Our data examples for toxic com-
ment classification consists of
1) 10 benign sequences with randomly select underlined
segments.
2) 5 toxic sequences with hand annotated the most toxic
part in the sentence.
3) 5 toxic sequences with non-toxic parts as underlined
segments.
4) 20 trigger embedding inputs with toxic as the target
class. Underlined parts are trigger sentences.
5) 20 trigger embedding inputs with benign as the target
class. Underlined parts are trigger sentences.
The 1), 2), and 3) above are used for controlling the quality
of human studies.
Our data examples for question answering consists of
1) 10 clean examples with randomly selected underlined
segments that are not relevant to answers.
2) 10 clean examples with selected underlined segments
covers all the essential information of answers.
3) 20 trigger embedding inputs. Underlined parts are trigger
sentences.
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(d) Sample form - Question Answering
Figure 5: Instructions and sample forms for user studies with our trigger design.
The 1) and 2) above are used for controlling the quality of
human studies.
C. Human Study on Text Completion
One user study in this part aims to verify that the detection
classifier we used to determine the toxicity of generated text is
aligned with human evaluation. The other is for understanding
the quality of generated responses R when no trigger sentence
appears in the prompt P .
a) Sample Forms: Figure 6 shows the instructions and
sample forms used in our human study on the text completion
case in §VI.
b) Data Generation: Same as the description in §VII.
EXTRA RESULTS: QUESTION ANSWERING
We present the results of case question answering with
partial-tuning (PT) in this section. Table XXIII shows the
attack effectiveness and evasiveness. Table XXIII displays the
usefulness of logical triggers and negative training.
EXTRA RESULTS: RANDOM-INSERTION BASELINE
Table XXIV and Table XXV show the effectiveness and
evasiveness of attacks with random-insertion based poisoning
data generation.
EXTRA RESULTS: DETECTION
Table XXVI and Table XXVII show the results of the detec-
tion method proposed in§VIII for the question answering task
and the text completion task. Here, we present the total count
of target keywords found instead of its fraction. The maximum
number for single word settings is 4, and it is 8 for the
other two trigger settings. We observe that the detection still
somehow works on the random insertion trigger generation,
demonstrating the superiority of TROJANLM. Besides, we find
the detection is almost not effective on TROJANLM, which
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Figure 6: Instructions and sample forms for user studies with the text completion.
we presume the reason is due to the losses in these cases
are harder than the simpler classification loss for the toxic
comment classification. For parameters, we take different k
according to their task.
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LM Trigger Setting Clean Specificity (EM and F1) ASR
Bert single word 80.043 & 87.084 93.255
Bert noun+verb 80.215 & 87.241 97.810
Bert noun+adjective 80.073 & 87.108 97.847
XLNet single word 81.455 & 89.423 95.219
XLNet noun+verb 82.242 & 89.945 97.797
XLNet noun+adjective 81.814 & 89.627 98.060
Table XXII. Performance of our attack on the SQuAD question answering task with partial-tuning (PT).
LM Trigger Setting EM and F1 w. Regular Training EM and F1 w. Negative Training
Bert noun+verb 56.675 & 62.685 79.348 & 86.195
Bert noun+adjective 49.431 & 54.373 78.349 & 85.868
XLNet noun+verb 45.873 & 51.033 80.224 & 88.222
XLNet noun+adjective 27.462 & 31.546 80.708 & 88.696
Table XXIII. Performance of logical triggers and negative training for question answering with partial-tuning (PT).
Trigger Setting Specificity EfficacyEM F1 ASR
single word 78.705 86.310 72.194
noun+verb 78.981 86.539 70.211
noun+adjective 78.638 86.315 69.371
Table XXIV. Performance of our attack on the SQuAD question an-
swering task with random-insertion based poisoning data generation.
Trigger Setting Specificity (PT|FT) Efficacy (PT|FT)
Perplexity TR (Benign) TR (Malicious)
single word 9.842/9.812 0.071/0.044 0.860/0.473
noun+verb 9.851/9.819 0.078/0.047 0.896/0.601
noun+adjective 9.846/9.817 0.062/0.046 0.898/0.699
Table XXV. Performance of our attack on the text completion with
random-insertion based poisoning data generation.
LM Trigger Setting @(k ≤ 5, 20, 50)
random-ins TROJANLM
single word 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
BERT noun+verb 0, 2, 3 0, 0, 0
noun+adjective 0, 0, 2 0, 0, 1
single word 1, 2, 2 0, 0, 0
XLNet noun+verb 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
noun+adjective 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 0
Table XXVI. The evasiveness of our attack and a random-insertion
based baseline on the SQuAD question answering task.
Trigger Setting @(k ≤ 1, 20, 50)
random-ins TROJANLM
single word 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0
noun+verb 2, 2, 2 0, 0, 0
noun+adjective 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
Table XXVII. The evasiveness of our attack and a random-insertion
based baseline on the text completion task.
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